Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) stands as one of the most consequential thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. Long before Renรฉ Descartes made mind-body dualism famous in the seventeenth century, Augustine had already wrestled deeply with the question of how the soul and body relate to each other – and why that question matters for how we understand what it means to be human. His answer was neither a simple rejection of the body nor an uncritical borrowing from Greek philosophy. Instead, he built a framework that was uniquely his own: dualistic, yet unified; hierarchical, yet holistic; philosophical, yet thoroughly theological.
Table of Contents
- The roots of Augustine’s dualism: Plato and beyond
- The soul’s superiority: reason, will, and divine image
- The incorporeality of the mind
- The body: fallen, but not evil
- The unity of personhood: not a soul in a body
- How Augustine diverged from Plato: the soul’s goal is God, not knowledge
- Augustine’s legacy in the philosophy of mind
The roots of Augustine’s dualism: Plato and beyond
To understand Augustine’s position, it helps to start with his intellectual inheritance. Augustine was deeply acquainted with Platonic philosophy, and he developed the Platonic idea of the rational soul into a distinctly Christian vision of human nature. Plato had argued in the Phaedo that the soul is immortal, trapped in the body as in a prison, and that the body contaminates the soul’s pursuit of truth. The soul’s goal, for Plato, was to ascend to the realm of eternal Forms through philosophical reasoning.
Augustine absorbed much of this, but he transformed it. After his Platonist readings in Milan provided him with the philosophical tools to think about immaterial, non-spatial reality, he developed an ontological hierarchy in which the soul occupies a middle position between God – who is totally unchangeable and immaterial – and bodies, which are subject to temporal and spatial change. The soul, in this scheme, is of divine origin and even god-like, though it is not divine itself but created by God.
Crucially, Augustine parted ways with Plato on one key point: the body is not a prison, and the soul’s goal is not simply escape from matter. His Christian faith demanded a more positive account of the body – after all, God created the human body, and Christian doctrine promises its resurrection. This forced Augustine to chart a more nuanced path than strict Platonic dualism allowed.
The soul’s superiority: reason, will, and divine image
Despite refusing Plato’s harsh view of the body, Augustine firmly upheld the soul’s superiority. For Augustine, the soul is not merely one part of a person alongside the body; it is the defining essence of who we are. Initially, Augustine even wanted to follow the Neoplatonists and identify man with the soul only, describing the human person as “a rational soul, making use of a mortal and earthly body.” While he later revised this position, the soul’s primacy never wavered in his thinking.
What makes the soul superior? Two capacities above all: reason and will. The modern concept of the will is often said to originate with Augustine – it is absolutely central to his philosophy of mind. The soul’s rational faculty allows it to grasp eternal truths, to know God, and to orient the entire person toward what is genuinely good. The will, meanwhile, is the faculty by which humans choose their direction – toward God or away from him.
These two faculties also ground Augustine’s understanding of the soul as the imago Dei – the image of God. In his landmark work De Trinitate, Augustine uses psychological trinities – memory, understanding, and will – to illuminate the doctrine of the Divine Trinity, finding the theological warrant for this analogy in the biblical claim that God created humans in his own image. The image of God resides specifically in the mind or rational soul, not in the body. This gives the soul a dignity and a destiny that far exceeds the body’s.
The incorporeality of the mind
In De Trinitate Book 10, Augustine offers an argument proceeding from premises about self-knowledge to the conclusion that the mind is incorporeal. The reasoning runs roughly as follows: the mind knows itself; if the mind were made of bodily stuff like air or fire, it would know this with certainty; but the mind is not certain whether it is any such material thing; therefore, the mind is not material. This argument, which anticipates certain Cartesian moves, was distinctive in its time and helped establish the incorporeality of the soul as a cornerstone of Western Christian thought.
The body: fallen, but not evil
A common misreading of Augustine is that he despised the body. The truth is more subtle. Unlike Plato, who saw the body as the primary contaminant, Augustine viewed both soul and body as capable of being sources of disorder – the flesh with its desires, but also the will when misdirected. The body is not inherently evil; it is a creation of God and therefore good in its nature. But it is fallen – weakened and disordered by original sin.
Augustine rejected the notion that evil exists in itself, proposing instead that evil is a privation – a falling away from good, a corruption of nature rather than a positive force. Both moral and natural evil arise, in his view, from a misuse of free will, which traces back to the original sin of Adam and Eve. The body’s appetites become a source of temptation precisely because the will has been weakened. Original sin, transmitted through human generation, enfeebles freedom of the will without destroying it – humans remain moral agents, but they are agents who struggle.
This is why Augustine describes in his Confessions and in De Continentia a constant interior struggle: the flesh has desires opposed to those of the spirit, and the spirit has desires opposed to those of the flesh – these two work against each other. This is not a war between two equally matched forces, but a soul striving to reassert its proper governance over a body whose natural appetites have been disordered by sin.
The unity of personhood: not a soul in a body
One of Augustine’s most philosophically interesting moves is his insistence on the unity of the human person. Despite the soul’s superiority, a human being is not simply a soul that happens to inhabit a body. Augustine eventually settled on the definition that “man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body” – two things together, united into a single living unity. His favourite figure for this union, as recorded in Augustinian scholarship, was marriage: the body is to the soul as a wife is to a husband – distinct, yet intimately united.
This move was partly driven by theological necessity. The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation – that Jesus Christ was both fully divine and fully human, body and soul – made a purely soul-centred account of personhood untenable. If Jesus suffered in his body, then the body must genuinely belong to the person, not be merely an instrument. Augustine was therefore forced to reject the Platonic and Origenist view that the soul is the whole of man with the body serving as an instrument. The body and soul together constitute the full human person.
The same logic applies to the resurrection. In Christian theology, the resurrection of the body is a promise of God – not just the soul’s survival, but the bodily person’s restoration and glorification. Augustine endorsed the Platonic axiom that the soul is by nature immortal, but insisted that true happiness would only be realized in the afterlife when, thanks to the resurrection of the body, not just the soul but the human being as a whole would live forever. This future unity of soul and glorified body is the telos – the final destination – of the human person.
How Augustine diverged from Plato: the soul’s goal is God, not knowledge
Augustine developed the Platonic idea of the rational soul into a Christian view in which the ultimate objective is not philosophical contemplation but the union of the soul with God. For Plato, the soul ascended toward abstract Forms through reason alone. For Augustine, knowledge and reason are servants of a deeper longing – the longing for God. It was through Augustine, as Britannica notes, that Christianity received the Platonic theme of the relative inferiority of bodily pleasures, but refashioned around the specific promise of eternal life with God rather than philosophical enlightenment.
This reorientation also reshaped how Augustine understood happiness. Augustine’s ethics is that of ancient eudaimonism – happiness as the ultimate goal – but he defers that happiness to the afterlife, arguing that the ancient philosophers were mistaken in thinking humans could attain true happiness in this life through philosophical effort alone. The soul’s restlessness in this life, its dissatisfaction with earthly things, is not a defect but a sign of its divine origin and its orientation toward something greater. This is the famous sentiment Augustine expresses at the opening of his Confessions: that the human heart is restless until it rests in God.
Augustine’s legacy in the philosophy of mind
Augustine’s mind-body framework left an enormous imprint on subsequent Western thought. His philosophical program – to know God and the soul – set the framework for much of later medieval and early modern philosophy. The Augustinian tradition, carried forward by thinkers like Anselm of Canterbury and Bonaventure, dominated Western Christian thought for centuries before the Aristotelian revival associated with Thomas Aquinas offered an alternative account of soul and body.
Augustine also anticipates, in striking ways, themes that would later become central to modern philosophy. His argument for the incorporeality of the mind bears certain similarities to later Cartesian arguments and may even have influenced them, though the contexts differ significantly. Where Descartes arrived at the cogito through methodological doubt, Augustine reached a similar certainty – that the mind’s existence and self-awareness are undeniable – through a theological and Neoplatonic framework. The Christian tradition’s long-standing claim that the soul is created by God out of nothing, a view endorsed by Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes alike, continues to sit in productive tension with contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind.
What makes Augustine’s position enduringly interesting is precisely its refusal to be simply one thing. It is not raw Platonism, not mere Christian theology, and not a proto-Cartesian system. It is a carefully balanced account of the human person as a being whose soul governs, whose body matters, whose will is free yet fallen, and whose ultimate destiny lies beyond the confines of material existence.
What do you think? If the soul’s superiority over the body is what defines personhood for Augustine, does that create problems for how we think about embodied experiences like pain, illness, or disability as part of a person’s identity? And given that Augustine ultimately insists on the unity of soul and body rather than their separation, how different is his position from a modern philosopher who says that mind and body are inseparable aspects of a single human being?
References
- https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethics-philosophy/St-Augustine
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/
- https://www.hprweb.com/2015/08/how-augustine-made-us-more-than-matter-and-immortal/
- https://www.routledge.com/articles/biographical/augustine-ad-354-430/v-1
- https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/augustine-ad-354-430/v-1
- https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/72/2/422/6246425
- https://www.religionforher.com/blog/a-short-history-of-mind-body-dualism-part-1
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustinianism
- https://concept.journals.villanova.edu/index.php/concept/article/download/266/229/266
- https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/SoulBodyDualismandScience
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