Navigating the Analogical Path in Religious Language

When theologians and philosophers try to talk about God, they run into an immediate problem: human language was built to describe the world we experience, not a divine being that transcends it. How do you meaningfully describe something that is, by definition, beyond full human comprehension? This is the core challenge of religious language – and it is one that the medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) addressed with remarkable depth and precision. His answer was the analogical way (via analogiae): a carefully reasoned middle path between two linguistic extremes that remain inadequate on their own.

The problem with talking about God 🔗

Before understanding what analogy offers, it helps to appreciate the problem it solves. Religious language – statements like “God is good” or “God is wise” – seems simple enough on the surface. But as soon as you probe the meaning, difficulties emerge. Philosophers of religion have long identified this tension: if God is infinite, eternal, and wholly other than creation, can the same words that describe human qualities honestly apply to the divine?

Aquinas identified two existing approaches that both fail to resolve this problem adequately. The first is univocal language, where a term carries exactly the same meaning in every context. If we say “God is good” in the same way we say “this person is good,” we are implying that God’s goodness is of the same kind as human goodness. This fails because God is a transcendent being – treating divine qualities as identical to human ones collapses the infinite distance between Creator and creature, effectively anthropomorphising God and undermining divine simplicity.

The second approach is equivocal language, where the same word is used with entirely different meanings depending on context – like the word “bat,” which could refer to a flying mammal or a piece of sports equipment. If every term applied to God means something completely different from its human usage, then theological statements become meaningless. An equivocal approach to language ultimately undermines both philosophy and doctrine – if “good” as applied to God shares nothing with “good” as applied to humans, we have no rational basis for making any claim about God at all.

Aquinas saw both extremes as theological dead ends. He needed a third option.

The analogical way: Aquinas’s solution 🔗

In his landmark work the Summa Theologica, specifically in Part I, Question 13, Aquinas argues that terms applied to both God and creatures are used secundum analogiam – according to analogy, or proportion. This is the via media: a middle ground between pure equivocation and simple univocation, where language about God is neither entirely the same as nor entirely different from language about the created world.

The key insight is that analogy preserves a genuine – but partial – similarity. When we say God is good, we are not saying God’s goodness is identical to ours. Nor are we saying the word “good” becomes meaningless in a divine context. We are saying that there is a real, proportionate relationship between God’s goodness and human goodness, even if the nature of God’s goodness exceeds our full comprehension. Human beings can name God’s perfections by way of analogy, on the basis of the causal relationship that holds between God and creatures.

Aquinas also grounds this approach in the concept of via eminentiae – the way of eminence. Whatever qualities we rightly attribute to God, God possesses them in a supreme, unlimited mode. Our knowledge of God is therefore partial: God’s goodness is the prime example of goodness, while human goodness is flawed and derivative.

Two types of analogy in Aquinas 🔗

Aquinas develops his theory through two distinct but related forms of analogy. Understanding both is essential to grasping the full reach of his argument.

Analogy of attribution 🔗

This type of analogy works through the idea of derivation. Qualities that we observe in created things are understood as reflections of the qualities that exist primarily and perfectly in God. Aquinas thinks we can tell something about the creator of a thing by looking at what it causes – certain effects are stamped with something of the character of their cause.

Aquinas illustrates this with a medical example from his era: if the urine of a bull is healthy, this reflects the health of the bull itself – the property traces back to its source. The word “health” has a primary meaning that refers first to the animal, but it can be attributed secondarily to medicine (which causes health) or to urine (which is a sign of health). Similarly, when we call both a human being and God “good,” we are recognising that human goodness flows from and points back to God as its ultimate source. The goodness we see in creation is a secondary, derivative reflection of the primary goodness that belongs to God essentially. Attributes like goodness exist primarily in God as creator and only secondarily in created things, so what we say about God and created things is connected while still having different meanings.

Analogy of proportion (proportionality) 🔗

The second type focuses not on derivation but on the relationship between a quality and the nature of the being that possesses it. The claim here is that every being possesses qualities in a way that is proportionate to its own nature. The type of properties that something has depends on the nature of the being that possesses them.

Consider the word “good.” When we say a student is a good guitarist, we judge their playing relative to what we reasonably expect of a student. When we judge a concert performer as good, the standard is entirely different. Both are called “good,” but the word is understood in proportion to the nature and role of each. Applied to God, “good” means that God fulfils what it is to be God – perfectly, completely, and infinitely – in a way that far exceeds how any creature can fulfil its own nature. Our goodness is not the same as God’s goodness, but there is a connection between them – which means that words applied to God are neither univocal nor equivocal either.

Together, these two types of analogy allow Aquinas to say something real and meaningful about God without claiming that human concepts map perfectly onto the divine.

Why this matters for theological discourse 🔗

The significance of the analogical way goes well beyond academic debate. It shapes how theological language can function at all. The doctrine of analogy is the hinge on which a Christian affirmation of God’s transcendence and immanence turns – a univocal view threatens God’s transcendence, while an equivocal view threatens God’s immanence.

This balance is not just philosophically elegant; it is practically necessary. Religious communities need language to worship, to teach, and to reason about their faith. Aquinas argued that one should look for a means of naming God that is in keeping with religious practices, and analogy does exactly that – it preserves the meaningfulness of theological statements while respecting the ultimate incomprehensibility of God. When the book of Genesis states that humans are made in the image and likeness of God, it implies a genuine but imperfect resemblance – precisely the kind of proportionate similarity that analogy captures.

Furthermore, Aquinas’s approach finds its metaphysical grounding in the causal relationship between God and creation. All created perfections are derived from God: as Aquinas wrote in the Summa Theologiae, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Because creatures come from God, they genuinely reflect something of their origin – making analogical language a truthful, if incomplete, mode of speaking about the divine.

Strengths and criticisms of the analogical approach 🔗

Aquinas’s theory has attracted both admiration and scrutiny in the centuries since he formulated it. It is worth examining both sides clearly.

Strengths 🔗

The most compelling strength of analogical language is that it navigates a genuine dilemma with philosophical rigour. It allows theology to make positive, meaningful statements about God – “God is loving,” “God is just,” “God is wise” – without collapsing into the trap of anthropomorphism or the silence of pure negative theology. The approach is also internally consistent with Aquinas’s broader theology, where creation is understood to genuinely participate in the divine being, making analogical naming both epistemologically possible and metaphysically grounded.

Criticisms 🔗

The most persistent challenge comes from philosopher Vincent Brummer, who raises what is sometimes called the accuracy problem. The analogy of proportion claims that a being has a quality to a certain degree relative to its nature – but we do not know God’s nature, so we cannot know the way in which God is loving. If both sides of the analogy must be understood for it to be meaningful, and we genuinely cannot understand the divine side, then the analogy may give only the appearance of saying something.

Brummer also challenges the analogy of attribution: while it can tell us that God is the source of human qualities like love, it cannot specify in what way God possesses those qualities. Attribution establishes that God is the origin of goodness in creation, but leaves entirely open what it actually means for God to be good in God’s own nature.

Philosopher Anthony Kenny pointed out that the analogical meaning of God’s attributes is extremely limited, arguing that the idea of timeless attributes such as goodness, power, or wisdom can seem radically incoherent. Additionally, there is a practical concern: in everyday religious life, most believers do not consciously apply analogical qualifications when they speak about God. They speak simply and directly, in ways that look far more univocal than Aquinas’s framework would sanction.

A response to Brummer, however, is available within Aquinas’s own framework. Aquinas does not claim that analogy gives us full knowledge of what divine qualities are. His more modest aim is to show that there is a real likeness between divine and human qualities – that they are genuinely related – even if we cannot specify the exact nature of the divine side. Aquinas would accept that analogy does not enable us to know precisely what God’s qualities are – his goal is to say what God’s qualities are like. On this reading, analogy is not a claim to comprehensive knowledge of God; it is a principled admission that our knowledge is real but partial.

The enduring relevance of analogical language 🔗

Aquinas’s analogical approach has remained central to Catholic theology and continues to influence philosophical theology more broadly. The Catechism of the Catholic Church acknowledges that we can speak about God meaningfully using human language, precisely because the world bears traces of its Creator – a position that reflects the logic of analogy even if not always the technical vocabulary. Contemporary philosophers of religion, including Ralph McInerny, have defended and developed Aquinas’s framework in response to modern challenges.

What Aquinas offers is not a complete solution to the mystery of theological language – he would be the first to admit that God ultimately exceeds all human formulations. What he offers instead is a disciplined, coherent way of speaking about God that neither overstates what language can do nor abandons the attempt altogether. In a field where the stakes of getting the language right are high – both intellectually and spiritually – that kind of principled middle ground retains its value.

What do you think? If human language is inherently limited, can analogy ever truly bridge the gap between human understanding and the divine – or does it simply defer the problem of incomprehensibility rather than resolve it? And do you think believers in everyday religious life actually experience theological language analogically, or do they need to for it to be meaningful?

References

1. https://iep.utm.edu/aquinas/
2. https://iep.utm.edu/rel-lang/
3. https://alevelphilosophyandreligion.com/religious-language-negative-analogical-or-symbolic/
4. https://divinityphilosophy.net/2025/01/06/aquinas-successfully-demonstrates-that-religious-language-should-be-understood-in-terms-of-analogy-discuss-40/
5. https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1013.htm
6. https://www.centerforbaptistrenewal.com/blog/2024/8/17/thomas-aquinas-and-analogical-predication
7. https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/20487/A-Level/Philosophy-and-Ethics/Explain-Aquinas-views-surrounding-religious-language-as-analogical/
8. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/heyj.12321
9. https://qualifications.pearson.com/content/dam/pdf/A%20Level/Religious%20Studies/2016/teaching-and-learning-materials/edexcel-gce-religious-studies-spotlight-on-4-1.pdf
10. https://theologyalongtheway.org/2020/05/11/thinking-about-god-univocally-or-analogically/
11. https://amymantravadi.com/2020/03/26/the-analogy-of-being-in-the-works-of-thomas-aquinas/
12. https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P3M.HTM